Bolton on Iran

OPTION 4 That leads, by process of elimination if nothing else, to the preemptive use of military force against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. No one argues that a successful strike would end the Iran problem, but that is not the point. Destroying key aspects of Iran’s program (such as the Esfahan uranium-conversion plant, the Natanz uranium-enrichment facility, the Arak heavy-water complex, and the Bushehr reactor) would buy time. Between two and five years is a reasonable estimate, and that is close to eternity, because during that period time would be on our side rather than on the proliferator’s.

President Obama is all but certain not to use force, so any decision regarding this option now rests with Israel alone. The revelation of the Qom site, and the risk that Iran has even more covert nuclear-related sites, may mean that the military option is already no longer viable: Destroying the known elements of Iran’s program will be risky and difficult enough, but the prospect of more unknown sites means that targeted military force cannot be relied upon to completely break Iran’s control over the nuclear fuel cycle. Israel would thus incur all the downsides of the attack without achieving its main goal.

Even if circumstances are not so parlous, Israel must now calculate that it has less time to act than it had before intelligence agencies confirmed Qom as a uranium-enrichment facility, meaning a strike may well happen within the next six months. A later attack is not precluded, and there is no red line beyond which it is unthinkable; nonetheless, every day that passes lowers Israel’s prospects for success, as Iran continues to protect and disperse its program, and as it acquires ever-stronger air defenses. While much has been speculated, pro and con, about the feasibility of an Israeli strike, one thing is certain: The Israelis have believed, at least until now, that they can succeed, and they will make the ultimate decision, one way or the other — not armchair pundits with incomplete information.

Many contend that the potential consequences of a preemptive strike are too horrible to contemplate, but such concerns are unlikely to deter Israel, since the result of not striking could well be a second Holocaust. The choice is not between the world as it stands today and the world after an Israeli attack; the choice is between the world after the attack and a world where Iran has nuclear weapons. That puts the oft-expressed fear of a spike in oil prices in context, at least for Israelis. Nor are Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s promises of a “defense umbrella” reassuring. At its time of maximum peril, the Jewish state is not going to rely on the goodwill of anyone, friend or foe.

In any event, Iran is highly unlikely to retaliate in a way that could prompt a direct confrontation with the U.S. military (such as attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz or increasing terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens in Iraq or elsewhere), or that would paralyze its own economy (such as suspending oil exports). Iran’s most likely response would be to unleash rocket attacks against Israel through its proxy armies, Hezbollah and Hamas. This prospect certainly complicates Israel’s decision-making on whether to strike Iran. (Direct Iranian missile or air attacks against Israel are unlikely, since Israel might well respond with nuclear weapons.)

One important consideration that is often ignored: However much they might publicly protest, nearby Arab states would privately welcome an Israeli attack. These governments fear Iran’s nuclear program as much as Israel does, but they are powerless to stop it. If Israel does the job, they are in a perfect place: Iran’s nuclear program will be badly damaged, and they will have another opportunity to criticize Israel. This also explains why Arabs will not interdict Israeli overflights to and from Iran. Moreover, within Iran, not everyone will necessarily rally behind the government, especially given post–June 12 developments. Effective public diplomacy could make clear that the target is the mullahs’ weapons program, not the Iranian people, and might even provide new impetus for regime change.

With so many risks of failure and retaliation, the use of military force is hardly attractive to Israel or anyone else. Even so, the consequences of a nuclear Iran could be far more devastating. Israel has not hesitated to strike preemptively before, starting with the Six-Day War of 1967, and including the destruction of the Osirak reactor outside Baghdad in 1981 and the North Korean reactor in Syria in September 2007. Don’t bet on passivity now.

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Iran’s nuclear-weapons program has cast a shadow over its region and the world for years. That kind of regime, with those kinds of weapons, is a continuing mortal threat to America’s friends and allies, and to international peace and security. Under President Bush, we had a chance to confront Iran’s challenge, but backed away from it. Under President Obama, we have a leader who doesn’t understand the magnitude of the threat, who flinches at unpleasant choices regarding force, and who believes that reductions of America’s own nuclear arsenal will persuade the IRGC to give up theirs. If Iran achieves its nuclear objectives, we will have only ourselves to blame.

Mr. Bolton, a former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.